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ABSTRACT
Much more than comparative advantage and free markets have been at play in shaping China's export
success. Government policies have helped nurture domestic capabilities in consumer electronics and
other advanced areas that would most likely not have developed in their absence. As a result, China
has ended up with an export basket that is significantly more sophisticated than what would be
normally expected for a country at its income level. This has been an important determinant of
China's rapid growth. What matters for China's future growth is not the volume of exports, but
whether China will continue to latch on to higher-income products over time.
Dani Rodrik














The phenomenal performance of China constitutes the great economic miracle of the last 
quarter century.  China’s economy has expanded by leaps and bounds, at historically 
unprecedented rates that few economists would have found plausible or feasible ex ante.  More 
importantly, this growth has lifted hundreds of millions of people from deep poverty and has 
helped improve health, education, and other social standards.  China has accomplished all this 
using its own brand of experimental gradualism--increasingly relying on markets and on price 
signals, yet until very recently doing so within the boundaries of a highly unorthodox set of 
institutions.   
That trade has played a significant role in this transformation is beyond dispute.  China 
would likely have grown even if the global economy had been closed.  And the very early stages 
of Chinese growth, based on rural reform, did not in any significant way rely on global markets.  
But from the mid-1980s on, one must suppose that China’s growth was fueled and sustained by 
the opportunities that the world market offered.  We can see the increasing footprint of foreign 
trade and investment in all the major aggregates.  The share of exports in GDP rose from 
virtually nothing in the 1960s to close to 30 percent in 2003, a rate of increase that is much larger 
than what has been experienced elsewhere in the world (see Figure 1).  Inward direct foreign 
investment has risen from close to zero in the early 1980s to around 5 percent of GDP.  The flip 
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side of these figures is that China has become one of the world’s biggest trading powers, 
accounting for 6% of global trade flows (Figure 2). 
Figure 1 
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Source: World Development Indicators Database   3
 
  The success with which China has integrated itself into the world economy raises many 
questions.  Drawing the real lessons from this experience is important, not only because China is 
the stellar example which other developing countries are trying to emulate, but also because the 
shape of China’s own future policies depend (or should depend) on these lessons. 
  The task is not made easier by the highly unconventional manner in which China has 
achieved its global integration. The standard list of recommendations for countries pursuing this 
goal includes: dismantling quantitative restrictions on imports, reducing import tariffs and their 
dispersion, making the currency convertible for current account transactions, eliminating 
bureacratic red tape and other impediments to direct foreign investment, improving customs 
procedures, and establishing the rule of law.  Measured by these guidelines, China’s policies 
resemble more those of a country that messed up big time than those of a country that became a 
formidable competitive threat in world markets to rich and poor countries alike.  In brief, China 
opened up very gradually, and significant reforms lagged behind growth (in exports and overall 
incomes) by at least a decade or more.  While monopoly state trading was liberalized relatively 
early (starting in the late 1970s), what took its place was a complex and highly restrictive set of 
tariffs, non-tariff barriers, and licenses.  These were not substantially relaxed until the early 
1990s.  
Table 1 shows the trend for import tariffs: In the early 1990s, tariffs still averaged above 
40 percent (among the highest in the world at the time), with significant dispersion and a 
maximum rate above 200%.  While the home market was highly protected, the penalizing effect 
of these tariffs on export production was neutralized through duty drawbacks and other 
incentives for export oriented investment projects.  Currency markets were not unified until 
1994.  Foreign investors were straddled with requirements to form joint ventures, transfer   4
technology to local partners, and source their inputs locally. And corruption and weak rule of law 
remain significant problems.  So China is not a straightforward story of export growth achieved 
through trade openness and free market forces.      
 








1982 55.6  ..  ..  .. 
1985 43.3  ..  ..  .. 
1988 43.7  ..  ..  .. 
1991 44.1  ..  ..  .. 
1992 42.9  40.6    220.0 
1993  39.9 38.4 29.9  220.0 
1994  36.2 35.5 27.9  .. 
1995 35.2  26.8  ..  220.0 
1996  23.6 22.6 17.4  121.6 
1997  17.6 16.0 13.0  121.6 
1998  17.5 15.7 13.0  121.6 
2000 16.4  ..  ..  .. 
2001  15.3 9.1 12.1  121.6 
2002 12.3  6.4  9.1  70.0 
  Source: Prasad (2004), p. 10. 
 
Neither is China a simple story of specialization according to comparative advantage.  
While labor intensive exports (toys, garments, simple electronics assembly) have always played 
an important role in China’s export basket, China also exports a wide range of highly 
sophisticated products.  Indeed, a major argument of this paper is that China is an outlier in terms 
of the overall sophistication of its exports: its export bundle is that of a country with an income-
per-capita level three times higher than China’s.  China has somehow managed to latch on to 
advanced, high-productivity products that one would not normally expect a poor, labor abundant 
country like China to produce, let alone export.  I will provide some evidence below that   5
suggests this has been an important contributor to China’s recent growth.  China’s experience 
indicates that it not how much you export, but what you export that matters. 
   The extent to which China’s sophisticated export basket has been a direct consequence of 
its unorthodox policy regime is not clear. But it is not too much of a stretch to imagine that 
China’s industrial structure has indeed been shaped by policies of promotion and protection, just 
as in the cases of earlier East Asian tigers.  I will return to this theme at the end of the paper, and 
offer some general remarks that may help frame future policy decisions in the general areas of 
trade and industrialization.  
  The outline of this paper is as follows.  In section II, I will provide a quantitative 
evaluation of China’s export structure in comparative context and argue that China’s trade 
pattern cannot be explained solely by factor endowments and other “economic fundamentals.”  
In section III, I will provide some evidence that links the types of goods that countries export 
with their growth performance, and show that China has benefited from having developed export 
industries that one would not normally associate with a country at that level of income.  Section 
IV briefly reviews the development of the consumer electronics industry in China to put some 
flesh on the statistical picture developed in previous sections and to highlight the role of 
government policies.  Section V provides concluding remarks and derives some implications for 
Chinese policymakers. 
 
II. The indeterminacy of comparative advantage 
  Consider how a country’s pattern of specialization and trade is determined.  The principle 
of comparative advantage dictates that trade patterns are determined by how relative costs of 
production within a country differ from those in the rest of the world. These differences are in   6
turn linked to differences in productivity levels across industries (as in the Ricardian model of 
trade) or to differences in relative factor endowments across countries (as in the Heckscher-Ohlin 
model).  In these models, entrepreneurs observe costs directly and make their investment 
decisions accordingly. 
But in a poor developing country, investors contemplating entry into new, non-traditional 
activities face considerable uncertainty about the costs of operation.  These costs will likely 
depend not just on factor endowments, but also on the investor’s success with technology 
adoption and adaptation, on the policy environment, and (perhaps also) on the number of other 
investors making similar investment choices.  The risks that arise from such uncertainty are 
borne disproportionately by early entrants into new industries, who therefore provide valuable 
informational spillovers to the rest of the economy. If they are successful, later entrants can 
observe the profitability of the incumbents and emulate them.  If they fail, they pay the full cost 
of their failure.  This externality implies that market forces on their own generate too little 
investments in new activities; to use the terminology of Hausmann and Rodrik (2003), they 
induce too little “self-discovery.” The result is that low-income countries produce too few high-
productivity goods that they could be producing (and selling in world markets) and incomes are 
lower than they would otherwise be. Conversely, rapidly growing countries are those that are 
able to somehow generate the investments in these non-traditional, higher-productivity tradables.     
To put some empirical flesh on these conceptual ideas, Ricardo Hausmann and I have 
recently developed an indicator that measures the productivity level associated with a country’s 
export basket.  This indicator, which we call EXPY is calculated in two steps.  First, for each 6-
digit commodity that is traded we compute the weighted average of the incomes of the countries 
exporting that commodity, where the weights are the revealed comparative advantage of each   7
country in that commodity (normalized so that the weights sum up to 1). This gives us the 
income level of that commodity, which we call PRODY.  The 6-digit level of classification yields 
more than 5,000 products for which PRODY can be calculated. Next we calculate EXPY as the 
weighted average of the PRODY for each country, where the weights are the share of each 
commodity in that country’s total exports.  More details on the construction of these indices are 
provided in the appendix. 
As would be expected, EXPY is strongly correlated with per-capita income: rich countries 
export goods that other rich countries export.  Figure 3 shows the scatter plot of EXPY against 
per-capita GDP for 1992.  The correlation coefficient is 0.83. But countries do not neatly lie 
alongside the regression line. Some countries are way below the regression line, while others are 
way above it.  In the latter group, India and China stand out.  It is striking that these two high-
performing economies have export profiles that are especially skewed towards high productivity 
goods.  In 1992, China’s exports were associated with an income level that is more than six times 
higher than China’s per-capita GDP at the time.  As we shall see, this gap has diminished 
somewhat over time, but it still remains high.     8
































































 Neither  is  EXPY well explained by other economic fundamentals that one can think of.  
Figures 4 and 5 show the partial correlations between EXPY and human capital and institutional 
quality, respectively, controlling for per-capita GDP.  These scatter plots use more recent trade 
data from 2002 to maximize the sample of countries.  We find a very weak positive partial 
correlation with the stock of human capital (Figure 4) and virtually no partial correlation with 
our index of institutional quality, the “rule of law” (Figure 5).  Hence the evidence on the 
fundamentals is mixed. While the productivity of a country’s exports is determined in part by its 
overall productive capacity and its human capital endowment, idiosyncratic characteristics also 
matter.  To take one telling example, a country like Bangladesh with a much similar set of 
relative factor endowments—abundant in labor, and scarce in human and physical capital—has 
an EXPY that is roughly 50% lower than China’s. It is clear that whatever these idiosyncratic   9
features may be (about which I speculate below), they seem to have China with an inordinately 
high level of EXPY.
1  In turn, this has apparently been an important driver of its recent economic 
growth as I will show in the next section. 
  










































































































































                                                 
1 Lo and Chan (1998) also emphasize that China’s trade structure cannot be explained only by comparative 
advantage, and they emphasize (like I do below) the role of production- and technology-oriented policies of the 
government.   10

























































































































































  It is also interesting to compare the progress over time of China’s EXPY with that of 
some of its important competitors. This is done in Figure 6, which shows the trends for EXPY in 
China, India, Hong Kong, and South Korea.  China has experienced the most rapid rate of 
growth in the sophistication of its exports since 1992.  While China still lags behind South Korea 
and Hong Kong, the difference in EXPY has steadily closed over time.  Moreover, the gap 
between China and India has actually increased over the past decade.
2   
                                                 
2 Note that EXPY  is calculated using commodity exports, so India’s software exports are not included in this 
comparison. Presumably, India’s EXPY would be significantly higher with software included.   11
Figure 6 










































  The findings here contrast with those of Wood (2001), who has argued that China’s 
export performance in skill-intensive products is below the level that would be expected on the 
basis of the country’s factor endowments.  Wood’s analysis is based on a cross-national 
benchmark derived from regressing the ratio of skill-intensive to labor-intensive exports on a 
measure of skill per worker in that country.  Wood reports that China’s actual share of skill-
intensive exports within manufactures in 1990 stood at 33 percent, compared to a predicted ratio 
of 40 percent (Wood 1991, Table 5).  One plausible reason for the difference in the results is that 
Wood’s method relies on a binary classification of goods (skill-intensive or not). Furhermore, the 
classification is carried out at a much more aggregate level than here.  (Remember that we 
calculate EXPY using the information from more than 5,000 distinct products.)  In practice, it is 
common for skill-intensive components of some “goods” to be done in one country and the less   12
skill-intensive components in others, as Wood himself notes (1991, 10).  An analysis at the 6-
digit level of disaggregation is more likely to capture these distinctions. 
It is worth noting however that there are often significant quality differences even within 
6-digit product categories. Even at this level of aggregation, Chinese exports often concentrate 
on the more labor-intensive, less sophisticated end of the product spectrum, at least when we 
compare them to the exports of significantly richer countries. Table 2 shows unit value 
comparisons for some of China’s leading electronics exports.  In most cases, China’s unit values 
are lower than those of South Korea, Malaysia, or Singapore.  There is therefore some truth to 
the argument that Chinese exports of electronics products tend to be low-cost, high volume 
products with not much technological sophistication, and that they therefore pose little threat to 
U.S. pre-eminence (see Lardy 2004).  But here too there are interesting exceptions.  For example, 
Chinese exports of video recorders and TV and video monitors have higher unit values than 
South Korean exports in these product lines.  And in any case, what is surprising is that a country 
at China’s income level is able to export such electronics products in the first place.  That is 
hardly the norm for other countries with similar factor endowments, as the cross-country 
comparisons above show.     13
Table 2: Unit value comparisons: electrical goods and equipment exports (US$ per unit, 2003)  
 
product name  China  S. Korea   Malaysia   Singapore 
Electric transformers,static converters and rectifier 0.855 5.713  0.884 0.229
Electric accumulators 1.317 2.519  17.295 1.248
Electric apparatus for line telephony, telegraphy  14.488 66.581 46.995 36.496
Electronic sound reproducing equipment, non-recording  13.520 50.003 52.966 68.260
Video recording and reproducing apparatus  48.733 39.356  90.926 112.492
Parts, accessories of audio, video recording equipment  9.875 26.222  14.299 n.a.
Radio and TV transmitters, television cameras  62.040 259.014 117.773 92.389
Radio, radio-telephony receivers 7.370 38.552 83.770 68.803
Television receivers, video monitors, projectors  72.903 17.987 144.185 195.939
Parts for radio, tv transmission, receive equipment  31.982 47.988  15.007 n.a.
Electronic printed circuits 1.774 65.973  2.281 49.581
Electronic integrated circuits and microassemblies  1.101 960.988  1.478 2.337
 
Source: UN Comtrade Database. 
 
III. It is not how much but what you export that matters 
  How do we know that the productivity level of a country’s exports (measured by EXPY) 
matters to economic performance?  It turns out that there is a robust relationship between the 
initial level of a country’s EXPY and the subsequent rate of economic growth experienced by that 
country.  Figure 7 is the relevant scatter plot: it shows the relationship between EXPY in 1992 
and growth over the 1992-2003 period, holding initial levels of income constant.  This is a 
positive and statistically significant relationship (at the 95% confidence level).  The estimated 
coefficient implies that a doubling of the productivity level of a country’s exports results in an 
increase in its overall per-capita GDP growth of around 6 percent.  Therefore, had China 
exported only those goods that countries at China’s level of income tend to export, its growth 
rate would have been significantly lower.  As the chart shows, a high level of EXPY does not 
fully account for China’s growth performance over this period—the other significant outlier is 
Ireland--but it does help explain it.     
   14
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  Is this a truly causal relationship?  Even though the regressor is the level of EXPY at the 
beginning of the period, it is still possible that causality goes from growth to EXPY  rather than 
the other way around (if growth and EXPY  are both persistent over time).  To rule this 
possibility out, we can use an instrumental variable approach, which requires locating an 
exogenous variable that plausibly influences growth only through the impact it has on EXPY.  
Population (or population density) is in fact one such instrument. The basic economic theory 
underlying this is simple. Go back to the original story of how comparative advantage is 
determined in part by a process of cost discovery by initial entrants in a new industry.  High 
productivity “discoveries” naturally attract more emulation, and the productivity of an 
economy’s tradable sector tends to converge towards the productivity level of the most profitable 
(most productive) activities discovered to date.  Larger economies have more entrepreneurs   15
engaged in discovery, and therefore, everything else being the same, will have maximum levels 
of productivity in tradables that are higher.
3 And indeed, just as this theory predicts, country size 
does turn out to have a positive and statistically significant impact on EXPY, even when we 
control for income, human capital, and other plausible regressors.  Hence, we can use this 
theoretical argument as a motivation for using measures of country size as an instrumental 
variable for EXPY.  When we do this, we find the same result that we did with simple OLS 
regressions.  Initial levels of EXPY are predictive of subsequent growth.   
  What is precisely the mechanism that makes EXPY a potent force for growth?  The theory 
is that once investors in a country “discover” a number of high productivity exportables, this sets 
off a powerful demonstration effect.  Other investors are drawn in, and as the sector and its 
suppliers expand, the economy’s resources get pulled from lower productivity activities into 
higher productivity activities.  This kind of growth driven by differential productivity across 
sectors and structural change lies at the root of China’s economic performance.  A visual 
indication of this is provided in Figure 8, which shows the progress of per-capita GDP in China 
alongside EXPY since 1992.  As we saw previously, the “quality” of China’s exports has 
increased somewhat, especially when compared to competitors. But when we plot EXPY 
alongside per-capita GDP, what really stands out is the stability of EXPY relative to per-capita 
GDP.  Per-capita GDP has been rapidly converging to the productivity level of the country’s 
export basket: it rose from 15% of EXPY to 35% in 2003.   This picture is strongly indicative of a 
process of productivity diffusion within the economy: the productivity gains associated with 
producing a set of sophisticated exportables is spread around the economy as labor moves across 
industries and across space to the higher productivity exportable activities. 
  
                                                 
3 For a formal model of this process, see Hausmann, Hwang, and Rodrik (2006).   16

































But the pattern shown in Figure 8 also raises a future challenge for China.  If much of 
China’s growth today is due to this particular pattern of convergence, will the economy not run 
out of steam once the process nears completion and the rest of the economy catches up to the 
productivity level of exportables?  As we have seen, the “quality” of China’s exportables has 
been increasing, but not nearly as rapidly as overall income. As a result, China is much less of an 
outlier today than it was in 1992 in terms of the cross-national relationship between income and 
EXPY (see Figure 9).  Using the estimated coefficients from the growth regression presented 
earlier, this necessarily implies a significant growth slowdown in China.  Furthermore, 
disaggregated analysis shows that the increase in China’s EXPY level over time is accounted for 
exclusively by a compositional shift from goods associated with low productivity to goods 
associated with high productivity.  New goods, that is goods that were not already exported in   17
1992, have made a negligible contribution to the rise in overall EXPY.
4  Sooner or later, 
therefore, China will have to “discover” new products to sell on world markets if growth is to 
continue at rates resembling recent ones. On the other hand, full GDP convergence to the current 
level of EXPY still implies a per-capita GDP for China that is much higher than today’s level. 
 
Figure 9: Relationship between EXPY and per-capita incomes in 2003 





































































IV. The roots of success: consumer electronics 
Among areas where China has been successful, consumer electronics stands out as one of 
those that would not have been expected a priori for a country at China’s level of income.  While 
low labor costs have helped, this cannot account for the entire story.  Indeed, estimates by the 
                                                 
4 Remember that the analysis here is carried out at the 6-digit level, so the absence of many new goods is 
meaningful.   18
McKinsey Global Institute show that labor productivity in China’s consumer electronics industry 
equals that in Mexico, a country where PPP-adjusted per-capita GDP is almost two times larger 
McKinsey 2003, 86).
5 Furthermore, China has steadily moved away from being simply an 
assembler of components. Increasingly, production is integrated backwards and the supply chain 
is moving to where the assembly is undertaken. So China’s success in consumer electronics is 
based on its ability to make a productivity jump. I will briefly discuss this case as it is 
emblematic of the broader statistical picture painted above.    
Foreign investors have played a key role in the industry’s evolution. They are the most 
productive of the producers, they are the source of technology, and they dominate exports.  
China’s openness to foreign investment and its willingness to create special economic zones 
where foreign producers could operate with good infrastructure and with minimum hassles must 
therefore receive considerable credit.  But if China has welcomed foreign companies, it has 
always done so with the objective of fostering domestic capabilities.  To that end, China has used 
a number of policies to ensure that technology transfer would take place and strong domestic 
players would emerge. Early on, reliance was placed predominantly on state-owned national 
champions. Later, the government used a variety of carrots and sticks.  Foreign investors were 
required to enter into joint ventures with domestic firms (in mobile phones and in computers). 
Domestic markets were protected to attract market-seeking investors, in addition to those that 
looked for cost savings. Weak enforcement of intellectual protection laws enabled domestic 
producers to reverse engineer and imitate foreign technologies with little fear of prosecution. 
And localities were given substantial freedoms to fashion their own policies of stimulation and 
support, which led to the creation of industrial clusters in particular areas of the country.  Huchet 
characterizes China’s policies as of the mid-1990s thus: “China’s technological acquisition 
                                                 
5 It is also telling that China’s EXPY exceeded Mexico’s by 2003.   19
strategy is clear: It allows foreign firms access to the domestic market in exchange for 
technology transfer through joint production or joint ventures” (1997, 270). 
The end result of all this can be seen in an industry structure that is very different from 
the one, say, in Mexico. As Table 3 shows, domestic firms play a significant role in China. In 
fact, 100% foreign owned firms are a rarity among the leading players in the industry. Most of 
the significant firms tend to be joint ventures between foreign firms and domestic (mostly state-
owned) entitities. A strong domestic producer base has been important in diffusing imported 
technologies and in creating domestic supply chains. In the words of the McKinsey Global 
Institute, “the international companies’ interaction with domestic companies has created a 
genuine global success story” (McKinsey 2003, 79, emphasis added).      20
Table 3:  Major consumer electronics firms in China by ownership type 
 
Market segment  Foreign owned  Joint venture  Non-FDI 
Mobile phone  •  Motorola  •  Motorola/Eastcom 
•  Nokia/Capitel, 
Southern 
•  Siemens/MII 
subsidiaries 
•  Samsung/Kejian 
•  SAGEM/Bird 
•  TCL 
PCs  •  HP 
•  Dell 
•  IBM/Great Wall 
•  Toshiba/Toshiba 
Computer (Shanghai) 
•  Epson/Start 
•  Taiwan GVC/TCL 
 
•  Lenovo (previously 
Legend) 
•  Founder 
•  Tongfang 
“Brown” goods    •  Sony/SVA 
•  Philips/Suzhou CTV 
•  Toshiba/Dalian 
Daxian 
•  Great Wall 
Electronics/TCL 
•  Changhong 
•  Konka 
•  Hisense 
•  Skyworth 
•  Haier 
•  Panda 
•  Xoceco 
“White” goods  •  Siemens  •  Samsung/Suzhou 
Xiangxuehai 
•  Electrolux/Changsha 
Zhongyi 
•  LG/Chunlan 
•  Mitsubishi/Haier 
•  Sanyo/Kelon, 
Rongshida 
•  Sigma/Meiling 
•  Hong Leong 
(SG)/Xinfei 
•  Toshiba 
Carrier/Midea 
•  Changling 
•  Gree 
Source: McKinsey (2003), p. 83. 
 
 
It is true that many of the Chinese companies created through government efforts ended 
up as failures. Accounts of industrial policy in China point to the low productivity and low 
technology absorption of many SOEs, and to the lack of coordination (across national ministries 
as well as across different levels of government) that characterizes Chinese policies (see Huchet   21
1997, Kraemer and Dedrick 2001).  But as in other areas of policy, government attitudes have 
been pragmatic and open to trying new approaches when old ones fail. A well-known case of 
failure was the early development of the color TV industry, which consisted in the 1980s of more 
than 100 companies operating at short production runs and high cost.  By the early 1990s, the 
industry had been consolidated thanks to the efforts of local governments and national 
leadership, which forced mergers and joint ventures with foreign firms. This reversal of policies 
led to the emergence in quick order of a profitable, export-oriented industry (see Lo and Chan 
1998).  
Moreover, it is possible that the importance of the weaknesses of the Chinese 
bureaucratic model is exaggerated. The essence of the self-discovery model of economic 
development is that you need only a few successes: once a small number of high-productivity 
activities are identified, they act as the lever for economic convergence by pulling resources in 
from lower productivity activities. Without state support and publicly funded R&D, a company 
like Lenovo (previously known as Legend) which became large and profitable enough to 
purchase IBM’s PC business recently would never have come into being.
6 Better to experiment 
and identify these higher-end activities than not try at all.  Lack of coordination can be an 
advantage in these circumstances, as it allows different things to be tried and for successes in one 
region to be copied elsewhere. Somewhat paradoxically, the hesitant, gradual, often conflicting 
manner in which policies have been formulated and implemented in China may have presented a 
more suitable environment for entrepreneurial experimentation and cost discovery than one that 
is centralized, top-down, and overly coordinated. 
In sum, China has benefited both from good fundamentals—low labor and materials 
costs, “outward orientation” in the form of SEZs, large market size—and from a determined 
                                                 
6 Lenovo’s majority owner is a state-owned entity.   22
government effort to acquire domestic capabilities and build a modern industry.  The large size 
of the economy has allowed policy experimentation. It also has allowed the government to use 
the carrot of the internal market to force foreign investors into joint ventures with domestic 
producers.  If China is producing an increasingly sophisticated set of consumer electronics 
product, it would appear that this is due as much to the policy environment as it is to the free 
play of market forces.  
While I have focused on the consumer electronics sector here, the same could be said of 
other export successes as well.  For example, the auto parts industry has been heavily promoted 
through local content requirements.  The Chinese government required foreign car companies 
investing in the market to achieve a relatively high level of domestic content within a short 
period of time (typically 70% within three years) (Sutton 2005, 9).  This forced these companies 
to cooperate closely with local suppliers to ensure that their technology and quality were up to 
par.  In his study of the auto supply chain in China, John Sutton found that the domestic first-tier 
suppliers had achieved quality levels close to international best practice (Sutton 2005).  One 
indicator of success is that China exported $1.7 billion worth of auto components by 2001.  
Another is that none of the foreign car manufacturers intended to switch to imports, once 
domestic content requirements were phased out to comply with WTO rules.  Sutton reports that 
“the view expressed in all cases was that the car-maker had developed local sources of supply 
that were superior, in terms of combination of cost and quality, to imported alternatives” (Sutton 
2005, 25).  Domestic-content requirements are widely derided as an inefficient tool of industrial 
policy.  The Chinese case stands in stark contrast to this.
7        
 
                                                 
7 Sutton’s portrayal of domestic content requirements in India is not much different; there too, it appears that these 
requirements helped promote a successful auto parts industry during the 1990s, prior to the coming into effect of 
WTO rules.   23
V. Implications 
I close with three set of implications for Chinese policymakers.  The first has to do with 
the need to understand better the fundamental underpinnings of China’s export performance and 
its economic success.  As I have argued above, much more than comparative advantage and “free 
markets” have been at play here.  China’s pattern of production and exports would have looked 
very different if the traditional forces of comparative advantage, pushing China to specialize in 
labor-intensive products “appropriate” to low income economies, were the sole determinant.  
Instead, China has ended up with an export basket that is significantly more sophisticated than 
what would be normally expected. Government policies have helped nurture domestic 
capabilities in consumer electronics and other advanced areas that would most likely not have 
developed in their absence.  Whatever static inefficiency costs may have been engendered in the 
process, this has had favorable implications for China’s growth.  This is an important point to 
remember as the inevitable debate between “market fundamentalists” and “planners” plays itself 
out in the Chinese context.    
  The second implication has to do with the sustainability of China’s export-oriented 
growth.  The question here is whether, with exports-to-GDP so high and rising, the Chinese 
growth model is inevitably running out of steam.   The ideas developed in this paper teach us that 
what matters for China’s future growth is not the volume of exports or its relation to GDP, but 
the “quality” of these exports.  Indeed, what is so special about China’s exports is not that they 
are voluminous or that its large pool of labor gives it a huge labor cost advantage. What stands 
out is that China sells products that are associated with a productivity level that is much higher 
than a country at China’s level of income.  This helps account both for why China’s trade is 
viewed as problematic in advanced countries, and for China’s rapid economic growth. The   24
economically relevant question for sustainability is not whether trade-GDP can keep on rising,  
but whether China will manage to latch on to higher- and higher-income products over time, and 
continue to fuel its growth thereby.  As we have seen, there has been a dramatic reduction over 
the last decade in the gap between EXPY and per-capita GDP.  Everything else being the same, 
this is something that is likely to slow down growth.   
  This brings us to the third point, having to do with the nature of future industrial policies.  
A clear implication of this paper is that China’s industrial policies—however incoherent they 
may have been—have had a hand in China’s past success.  Future economic performance may 
also need to be supported by such policies.  This is of course also a lesson from the experience of 
other East Asian success stories: Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, and Singapore.    
  The usual criticism of industrial policy is that governments cannot pick winners, and 
therefore should not try.  But this is not the right way to think about industrial policy.  In 
environments that are rife with uncertainty and with technological and informational spillovers, 
markets under-provide investment in non-traditional products. The appropriate role for industrial 
policy is to fill in this market incompleteness by subsidizing investments in new products. It is a 
given that not all of these additional investments will prove to be socially profitable. Good 
industrial policy consists of withdrawing support from those projects that are revealed to be 
failures, so that resources do not get bottled up in unproductive activities. Hence the appropriate 
criterion of success for industrial policy is not that “only winners should be picked” (an 
impossible task) but that “losers should be let go” (a much less demanding and more doable 
task).  The latter is the relevant yardstick against which industrial policies ought to be measured.  
Therefore, a key question for China going forward is whether Chinese policies will 
maintain their experimental and flexible nature—whether governments will remain willing to   25
support new industries but also willing to turn against ventures that under-perform.  Designing 
the appropriate institutional structure to foster such an experimental, carrot-and-stick approach to 
industrial policy is an important challenge facing Chinese policy makers.
8   This is an area where 
institutional transplantation does not work very well. We can identify the higher-order principles 
involved at a sufficient level of generality, but need to fashion blueprints that are suited to the 
local context.  The challenge for China therefore is to develop institutional models that are based 
on Chinese realities.  
                                                 
8 In Rodrik (2004) I discuss some of the issues involved and present some broad guidelines drawing from examples 
in East Asia and Latin America.   26
Appendix: Construction of PRODY and EXPY 
PRODY is the weighted sum of the per capita GDP of countries exporting a given 
product, and thus represents the income level associated with each of these goods. Let countries 
be indexed by j and goods be indexed by l.  For any given year, the value of total exports of 
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The numerator of the weight  j jk X x /  is the value-share of the commodity in the country’s 
overall export basket.  The denominator of the weight,  ( ) ∑ j j jk X x / , aggregates the value-share 
across all countries exporting the good.  By using export share rather than export volume, the 
weighting scheme tries to ensure that adequate weight is given exports that are important to 
smaller poorer countries.   
 







EXPY ∑ =  
 
This is a weighted index of the representative income associated a country’s exports, where the 
weight is simply the value share of the product in the country’s total exports.  
 
Our trade data comes from the United Nations Commodity Trade Statistics Database 
(COMTRADE).  The dataset includes products at the 6-digit level in the Harmonized System for 
the years 1992 to 2003.  The value of exports is measured in current US dollars, which we then 
convert to 2000 dollars for comparison with real GDP per capita series.  The number of countries 
that report the trade data vary considerably from year to year.  However, we construct the 
PRODY measure for a consistent sample of countries that reported trade data in each of the years 
1999, 2000 and 2001.  After deleting some missing observations, our data set consists of 5,023 
PRODY observations.  Note that we use the average PRODY from 1999-2001 to construct the 
EXPY index, so that the PRODY that go into the construction of EXPY themselves do not vary 
over the years.  
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